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Using medical malpractice claims with payments of $25,000 or more that closed in Texas
from 1990 to 2003, this study quantifies physicians’ insurance limits and examines the
connection between policy size and payments on claims. It finds that most physicians had
less than $1 million (nominal) in coverage, that real policy size declined, that settlements at
the policy limits were common, that payment size was stable or falling, and that payments
above the policy limits were rare. It also finds that physicians rarely made out-of-pocket
payments, suggesting the policy limits often cap recoveries, and that the frequency of
out-of-pocket payments declined as policy size increased. Results are presented separately
for ‘‘perinatal physicians.’’
The Geneva Papers (2008) 33, 177–192. doi:10.1057/gpp.2008.3
Keywords: medical malpractice; policy limits; claims; liability insurance; payments;
settlements

Introduction
Many physicians express the fear of being ‘‘one lawsuit away from financial disaster’’.1
Reflecting this, the American Medical Association, state medical societies, and tort
reformers have proposed legislation that would reduce physicians’ exposure to
malpractice liability. Whether the fear has much foundation is unclear. Some sources
* The authors thank James Forman, Kris Henning, Greg Klass, Russell Localio, John Mikhail, Nick
Rosencranz, Stephen Salop, and David Vladeck for comments. Versions of this article were presented at
the Boston University School of Law, the Georgetown University Law Center, New York University
School of Law, the Northwestern University Law School, the University of Chicago Law School, the
University of Michigan Law School, and the University of Texas at Austin School of Law. We are grateful
for comments received on these occasions. We owe special thanks to Vicky Knox at the Texas Department
of Insurance and to JaeJoon Han, An-Shih Liu, and Rachel Miras-Wilson for research assistance. Funding
for this study was provided by the Columbia Law School, the Georgetown University Law Center, the
University of Illinois College of Law, and the University of Texas at Austin School of Law.
1
See Jenkins (2003); Lowes (2003); Rice (2003).
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contend that insured physicians bear little personal exposure,2 even asserting
the existence of ‘‘an unwritten rule among plaintiffs’ attorneys to leave a physician’s
personal assets alone’’.3 Because insured physicians’ out-of-pocket payments on
malpractice claims have rarely been studied empirically, disagreement persists.4
Even less is known about physicians’ insuring practices. Although the conventional
wisdom is that most physicians purchase policies with $1 million per occurrence
limits,5 few studies test this belief, and those that do focus on dentists or
anesthesiologists, rely on surveys, contain little or no data on policy size, or cover
short time spans.6 Intuitively, one should expect physicians to buy different amounts
of coverage, reflecting variations in states’ tort regimes and financial responsibility
requirements, malpractice risks associated with different specialties, costs, and
tolerance for risk.7
Using a unique database maintained by the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI)
of malpractice claims that closed with payments from 1990 to 2003, this study
examines the insuring practices of Texas physicians and quantifies insured physicians’
out-of-pocket payments. We find, first, that total payments at or near policy limits
were common, especially when physicians had small policies or patients were
newborns. Second, insured physicians rarely made out-of-pocket payments to resolve
malpractice claims. This was true regardless of policy size, but doctors with larger
policies used personal assets to resolve claims less often than others. Primary and
excess carriers jointly contributed 99 percent of all dollars paid to claimants during our
period of study. Third, only about one-third of primary policies had limits of $1
million (nominal) or more, about the same percentage as had limits of $200,000
(nominal) or less. Fourth, over time, nominal policy size was stable but real policy size
fell substantially.8

Methods
Data description
TDI requires all malpractice carriers (including mutuals, reciprocal and interinsurance exchanges, pools, joint underwriting associations, and certain self-insurance
mechanisms and trusts) to submit detailed reports on closed claims with payments by
all defendants exceeding $25,000 (nominal). Certain university hospitals with selffunded plans are not required to report. In 2005, TDI estimated that reporting entities
covered 75 percent of licensed practicing Texas physicians.

2
3
4
5
6

7
8

See Baker (2001); Rice (2006).
Rice (2005).
Lawthers et al. (1992).
Cheney (1999); Quinn (1998).
Lawthers et al. (1992); O’Hara et al. (1994); Milgrom et al. (1994); Conrad et al. (1995); Milgrom et al.
(1995); Cheney (1999).
American Medical Association (2005); General Accounting Office (2003).
These findings are developed at greater length in Zeiler et al. (2007).
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Reports are available on claims closed 1988–2003, but we limit the data set to
1990–2003 because of under-reporting in prior years.9 To avoid inflation-induced
changes in case mix over time caused by the reporting threshold, we exclude claims
with payouts below $25,000 in 1988 dollars. This eliminates 572 claims, 6 percent of
the reports but only 1 percent of dollars paid. We also exclude claims against service
providers other than physicians, claims for injuries caused other than by surgical or
medical care, and claims covered by lines of insurance other than medical professional
liability.
The data set contains separate reports for each defendant when multiple defendants
made payments on the same claim. For example, a claim by a single patient paid by
three physicians is reported as three separate claims in the data set. Our data set
includes 9,525 reported payments made 1990–2003 relating to 8,400 distinct cases. We
include all separate reports when analyzing policy limits and payments but exclude
‘‘duplicate’’ reports when discussing jury verdicts to avoid counting a single verdict
more than once. We report all results in 2003 dollars (‘‘2003$’’) using the Bureau of
Labor Statistics average consumer price index for changes in prices of all goods and
services purchased for consumption by urban households, 2003 being the last year in
our data set.
The ‘‘total payment’’ for a particular physician is the sum of the deductible, the
primary carrier’s payment, the excess carrier’s payment, and the physician’s out-ofpocket payment. The out-of-pocket payment is the physician’s contribution reported
as being an amount paid above the policy limit.
Malpractice policies contain ‘‘per occurrence’’ limits and aggregate annual limits.
We used the policy’s ‘‘per occurrence’’ limit to measure policy size when available
(8,657 reports). Instead of reporting a ‘‘per occurrence’’ limit, carriers sometimes
indicated a ‘‘combined single’’ limit. Following TDI’s practice, we used this to measure
policy size for 868 claims for which ‘‘per occurrence’’ limits were not reported. In
robustness checks, we obtained similar results when we examined only claims with
‘‘per occurrence’’ limits.
Some physicians purchase excess policies to cover amounts in excess of primary
policy limits. 136 reports include amounts paid by excess carriers. When comparing
payouts to limits, we exclude these claims because we lack information on excess
policy limits. 280 reports include amounts paid by physicians as deductibles. The mean
(median) deductible was $39,000 ($25,000) (2003$). Deductibles of $100,000 or more
(2003$) appear in 20 reports.
We lack data on physician specialty, but we have data on patient age when injured. We
therefore use patient age to divide our sample into ‘‘perinatal physicians’’ (physicians
whose claims involved patients aged 0–1 month) and non-perinatal physicians (all others).
We also used the following data sources: for Texas population, U.S. Census
Bureau;10 for number of Texas physicians, Texas Department of State Health

9

10

For a discussion, see Black et al. (2005). Statistical tests found no evidence that reports filed in 1988–1989
are biased relative to reports filed in later years, and the main results reported here are robust to analyses
including these years.
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/.
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Services;11 and for Texas personal health care expenditures, Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services.12

Legal environment
Compensatory damages in medical malpractice cases in Texas were unlimited
throughout the study period, except in cases involving death. In wrongful death
cases, the sum of compensatory damages and prejudgment interest was capped at
$500,000 in 1977 dollars, adjusted for inflation (the 2003 cap was $1,540,000). Punitive
damages were also capped.
In 1995, Texas enacted a handful of tort reforms, including a stricter cap on punitive
damages, changes in the applicability of contributory negligence to punitive damages,
other contributory negligence reform, penalties for frivolous lawsuits, protection for
Good Samaritans, joint and several liability reform, reform to arbitration rules in
medical malpractice cases, general medical liability reform related to pretrial
procedures and expert witness testimony, changes to burden of proof rules regarding
punitive damages, statute of limitations for minors, and venue reform.13 In addition,
punitive damages were capped at different amounts depending on whether a case was
filed before September 1, 1995. These reforms may have reduced physicians’
malpractice exposure.

Statistical methods
We performed all statistical analyses with STATA and Clarify.14 We performed
diagnostic tests for all regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS) and used nonparametric tests when the diagnostics indicated that assumptions of the OLS model
were not satisfied.

Results
Payment-to-limit ratios
To determine the relationship between claim payments and primary insurance limits,
we computed payment-to-limit (PTL) ratios for the 9,389 cases with payments by
primary insurers but not excess carriers. A $500,000 payment on a $1 million policy
produces a PTL ratio of 0.5. The ratio equals 1 when the payment equals the primary
policy limit.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of PTL ratios for all claims and for claims involving
perinatal physicians. The spikes at the policy limits are obvious and large. Sixteen
percent of all claims, 32 percent of perinatal claims, and 14 percent of non-perinatal
11
12
13
14

http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/chs/hprc/PHYS-lnk.shtm.
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/ nhestatesummary2004.pdf.
Avraham (2006).
On STATA, see King et al. (2000). On CLARIFY, see Tomz et al. (2001).
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Figure 1. Distributions of payment-to-limit ratios: All claims (n¼9,389) and perinatal claims (n¼1,037).
Distributions of payment-to-limit ratios for all claims and for perinatal claims against physicians covered by
medical malpractice policies and closed from 1990 to 2003 with payout>$25,000 in 1988 dollars, excluding
claims with payments by excess carriers. Perinatal claims involved patients aged 0–1 month. Each bar
represents a 0.05 increment. All claims with ratios greater than 2 were set equal to 2.

claims have ratios between 0.95 and 1 (inclusive); 14 percent of all claims, 29 percent of
perinatal claims, and 12 percent of non-perinatal claims have ratios of exactly 1. We
obtain similar distributions using various subsets of the data (e.g., claims involving
only single or only multiple physicians, claims involving brain damage or death) and
across closing years. Because we lack data on eroded limits, which may be caused by
payments on prior claims or defense costs, Figure 1 may understate the spike in
payouts at available policy limits.

The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance — Issues and Practice

182

50%
all claims (n=9,389)

45%

perinatal claims (n=1,037)

40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Closing Year

Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of a claim payment at the policy limit by year claim closed. Trends in
predicted probabilities of a claim payment at the policy limits by closing years 1990–2003 for claims with
payout>$25,000 in 1988 dollars, excluding claims with payments by excess carriers. Perinatal claims
involved patients aged 0–1 month. Error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 2 displays trends in predicted probabilities of a claim payment made at the
policy limit (PTL ratio equal to 1) across closing year. A logistic regression using all
claims reveals no significant trend over time (odds ratio¼1.00, 95 percent
CI¼[0.990,1.019]). Using only perinatal claims, however, the same test reveals a
statistically significant positive correlation between the likelihood of a claim payment
made at the policy limit and closing year (odds ratio¼1.06; 95 percent
CI¼[1.034,1.103]).
The size of the at-limit spike is sensitive to the amount of insurance available to
cover the claim. As Figure 3 shows, the spike is large when policy size is small, but
shrinks as coverage increases. For claims covered by policies with limits less than or
equal to $250,000 (2003$), 35 percent end up in the spike. Only 4 percent end up in the
spike when limits are greater than $1 million (2003$).

Payment sources
Payments from sources other than primary insurers were rare. Ignoring deductibles
(present in 263 cases without excess carrier payments), Table 1 shows that almost 98
percent of claims were resolved with primary carriers’ money alone. Payments by
primary carriers accounted for 96.8 percent of total dollars paid (2003$), payments
by excess carriers accounted for another 2.3 percent, and deductibles accounted
for 0.4 percent. Physician out-of-pocket payments accounted for 0.5 percent of all
dollars paid.
1.5 percent of all claims (2.4 percent of perinatal claims) have PTL ratios>1.
Surprisingly, 101 of these claims were resolved with primary carriers’ money alone,
meaning that insurance carriers paid more than the limits. They may have done so to
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Figure 3. Distributions of payment-to-limit ratios by policy size. Distributions of payment-to-limit ratios
for various ranges of real policy limits measured in the closing year for all claims and for perinatal claims
against physicians covered by medical malpractice policies (measured in 2003 dollars) and closed from 1990
to 2003 with payout>$25,000 in 1988 dollars, excluding claims with payments by excess carriers. Each bar
represents a 0.05 increment. All claims with ratios greater than 2 were set equal to 2.

Table 1 Sources of funds paid on claims, 1990–2003
Payment by
primary insurer?

Y
Y
Y
Y
Otherb
Total

Payment by
excess carrier?

Payment by
physician
out-of-pocket?

Number
of claims

% of total
number

Total dollars paid
(in millions of
2003 dollars)

% of total
dollars

N
Y
N
Y

N
N
Y
Y

9,322a
128
55
7
13

97.87
1.34
0.58
0.07
0.14

$2,438
$89
$29
$11
$1

94.95
3.46
1.12
0.43
0.04

9,525

100.00

$2,568

100.00

a

Deductibles paid in 263 cases.
Includes claims paid using only physician deductible (n=12) or excess carrier funds and physician deductible
(n=1).
b

protect themselves against bad faith refusal-to-settle claims by insured physicians or to
avoid future defense costs. Payments above the limits from any source are more
common when policies are small, occurring in 3.7 percent of the cases with real
coverage measured in the closing year p$250,000, vs. 0.7 percent of cases with real

The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance — Issues and Practice

184

coverage of $500,000 or more (difference significant at the 1 percent level). The inverse
relationship between policy size and frequency of payments above the limits probably
reflects the underlying distribution of injuries (i.e., fewer injuries result in damages that
exceed larger policies).
Physician out-of-pocket payments appear in 0.65 percent of the reports (an average
of four such payments per year), with no apparent trend in frequency. Of 62 total outof-pocket payments, 38 were $100,000 or less, 14 were $100,001–300,000, 10 were
$300,001 or more, all in 2003 dollars. The real mean (median) was $190,000 ($54,000)
for all claims. No significant time trend in real payment size was detected (Cuzick’s
non-parametric test for trend across ordered groups15 produced a z of 0.51 (P¼0.61)).
In 18 of the 62 cases in which physicians made out-of-pocket payments, primary
insurers paid less than the reported policy limits. Possible explanations for this pattern
include eroded primary limits, coverage disputes, prior physician refusal to settle, or
patients’ insistence on personal contributions from physicians.
As one might expect, the likelihood of an out-of-pocket payment decreased as
insurance coverage increased. Out-of-pocket payments appeared most often when
real coverage was $250,000 or less, occurring in 1.3 percent of the cases (32 of 2,488).
With policies larger than $500,000, the frequency dropped to 0.4 percent (23 of 6,160).
It is important to remember that these estimates reflect the experience of physicians
with paid claims, not the ex ante risks faced by all physicians with policies of a
given size.
Out-of-pocket payments were both more common and larger in perinatal cases,
which account for 11 percent of reported payments but for 26 percent of out-of-pocket
payments (16 of 62). In a logistic regression that controlled for policy size and payment
size, however, the difference in the likelihood of out-of-pocket payments in perinatal
and non-perinatal cases was not statistically significant (odds ratio¼0.84; 95 percent
CI¼[0.19,3.71]). The small number of out-of-pocket payments, which limits the test’s
power to detect a difference, may account for this. The real mean (median) out-ofpocket payment for perinatal claims was $270,000 ($120,000) compared to $160,000
($40,000) for non-perinatal claims (test of differences has insufficient power due to
small number of out-of-pocket payments).
Coverage purchases
Because PTL ratios and the frequency of out-of-pocket payments vary with policy size,
it is important to know how much coverage physicians purchase. Our data set (for
claims closed from 1990 to 2003) includes claims on policies sold as early as 1965 but
provides reasonably complete data only on policies purchased from 1988 through 1999,
due to the lag between the filing date and the claim closing date. Table 2 provides
distributions of policies purchased by per occurrence limit (in nominal dollars) and
purchase year.
The conventional wisdom posits that most physicians buy medical malpractice
policies with $1 million (nominal) per occurrence limits. For all years in our data set,
15

Cuzick (1985).
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Table 2

Distribution of policies purchased by per occurrence limit and purchase year (in nominal dollars)
Per occurrence limits (nominal)

Purchase
year

Number of policies
purchased a

$100K
(%)

$200K
(%)

$500K
(%)

$1M
(%)

$2M
(%)

Total
(%)

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
1988-1999

409
567
520
608
630
688
633
634
580
631
656
600
7,156

11
11
11
12
10
8
10
6
4
6
6
4
8

15
25
23
23
23
24
24
27
25
25
22
27
24

25
29
30
30
29
28
24
23
22
22
21
21
25

37
24
24
24
27
28
30
33
35
35
41
41
31

4
1
3
2
4
2
3
4
5
3
2
4
3

92b
91
90
91
92
91
92
93
91
90
92
96
92

a

In each row, the total includes all policies purchased that year, including policies with limits other than
those shown. On average across purchase years, 0.1 percent of policies purchased had limits of less than
$100K, 0 percent between $100K and $200K, 2 percent between $200K and $500K, 3 percent between $500K
and $1 million, 1 percent between $1 million and $2 million, and 2 percent above $2 million.
b
These totals do not sum to 100 percent because not all policy sizes are included.

however, only 31 percent of the reports indicated policies with $1 million limits, while
32 percent indicated nominal limits of $200,000 or less. The median nominal policy
limit for all claims was $500,000 and was constant during our sample period.
Figure 4 displays trends in real coverage amounts by year of purchase, separating
perinatal physicians from non-perinatal physicians. For both groups, from 1988 to
1999 mean and median nominal policy limits purchased were stable in nominal dollars
but fell by roughly 30 percent in real dollars (Cuzick’s non-parametric test for trend
across ordered groups on purchases in real dollars produced a z of 7.09 (Po0.001)
for perinatal and 12.70 (Po0.001) for non-perinatal physicians).
In most purchase years analyzed, mean limits were smaller for perinatal than for
non-perinatal physicians. Because median policy size for both groups generally is the
same across years, the lower mean for perinatal physicians must reflect fewer perinatal
policies with high limits. In fact, 25 percent of perinatal claims involved policies with
nominal limits X$1 million vs. 39 percent of claims involving non-perinatal physicians
(difference¼14 percent; a t-test indicates a 95 percent CI¼[9.8 percent,16.9 percent]).
Perinatal physicians carried smaller policies even though their payouts were larger on
average. Given the higher payouts and smaller average policy limits associated with
perinatal claims, it follows that the mean PTL ratios for perinatal claims will be higher
than in non-perinatal claims. Excluding claims with excess carrier payments, the
average PTL ratio was 67 percent in perinatal cases vs. 45 percent in non-perinatal
cases (difference¼22 percent; a t-test indicates a 95 percent CI¼[18.6 percent,
25.6 percent]).
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Figure 4. Trends in mean and median purchased policies (measured in 2003 dollars). Trends in mean and
median purchased policies measured in 2003 dollars in the purchase year for perinatal claims and nonperinatal claims against physicians and closed from 1990 to 2003 with payout>$25,000 in 1988 dollars.

Claim rates and payments
Table 3 presents trends in the number of large paid claims. The number of paid claims
was stable per million Texas residents (OLS regression of number of claims on year
produces coefficient on year¼0.3; 95 percent CI¼[0.7,0.2]), but showed a
statistically significant decline, at the 5 percent level, per 1,000 non-federal practicing
Texas physicians (coefficient on year¼0.5; 95 percent CI¼[0.8,0.2]) and per $1
billion in Texas health care spending (coefficient on year¼0.65; 95 percent
CI¼[0.79,0.51]).
Payments were also fairly stable, as shown in Table 3. For non-perinatal cases, the
mean real payment per claim dropped from $303,000 in 1990 to $253,000 in 2003, but
the median increased from $141,000 to $187,000. This suggests that over time
relatively fewer extremely large payments were made but, at the same time, there were
relatively fewer smaller payments. Payments exceeding $1 million (2003$) comprised
6.5 percent of the claims in 1990 compared with 2.5 percent in 2003. Similarly, total
payments of less than $100,000 (2003$) comprised 35 percent of the claims in 1990
compared with 31 percent in 2003. Perinatal claims saw decreases in both the mean
and median real payment.
Plaintiff jury verdicts were present in a small portion of closed claims (n¼189; 1.98
percent of all paid claims). The mean (median) real verdict was $2,410,000 ($640,000);
the mean (median) real payout after verdict was $760,000 ($400,000). No significant
trend over time in verdicts (adjusted for inflation) was detected (Cuzick’s nonparametric test for trend across ordered groups produced a z of 0.977 (P¼0.33)).16

16

Hyman et al. (2007) provide a detailed analysis of claims closed after jury verdicts.

Table 3 Trends in number of claims adjusted for population, physician population, medical expenditures and total payment summary statistics by closing year
(in thousands of 2003 dollars)
Closing
year

36
32
42
36
34
38
34
37
31
35
35
34
30
36

Number of paid
claims per
1,000 TX
physicians

27
24
32
28
25
28
25
26
22
23
23
22
20
23

Number of paid
claims per $1 billion
in personal
medical
expenditures

16
13
16
13
12
13
11
11
9
10
9
9
7
8

All claims

Perinatal claims

Non-perinatal claims

Mean total
payment

Median total
payment

Mean total
payment

Median total
payment

Mean total
payment

Median total
payment

325
287
293
266
290
247
276
250
249
275
233
268
269
258

141
135
145
159
167
151
160
158
162
166
160
182
184
195

481
305
404
437
406
432
368
294
215
403
294
303
307
318

264
203
263
253
247
241
209
221
208
218
213
208
204
200

303
284
271
242
275
225
266
245
253
261
228
264
265
253

141
135
132
158
154
133
153
144
151
165
160
177
176
187

Trends in number of adjusted claims and summary statistics for total payments measured in 2003 dollars for perinatal, non-perinatal, and all claims with
payout>$25,000 in 1988 dollars.
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Analysis of county-level variations
Using Texas State Data Center and Office of the State Demographer data on countylevel variation in urbanization, we found no substantial differences between urban and
rural counties in PTL ratios, policy purchases, or payment size trends (data and details
available from authors upon request).

Discussion
We report three central findings. First, payments on medical malpractice claims
stacked up at the policy limits, especially when physicians carried smaller policies, and
payments above the limits were rare. Second, physician out-of-pocket payments were
uncommon. Third, both non-perinatal and perinatal physicians bought considerably
less real coverage over time. The decline corresponded with lower average payments
on perinatal claims, and may have contributed to it. We are able to report these
findings only because Texas mandates a data collection system to track insurance and
liability system activity. Having such systems in all states would facilitate the study of
the malpractice system and greatly advance the policy debate.17
The spike in payouts at the policy limits likely includes many claims with higher
values that were negotiated downward. In these cases, patients received less
compensation than their claims warranted. Hyman et al.18 report that patients who
prevail at trial often settle for the policy limits and recover less (often much less) than
juries award. The spike may also include some claims that insurers overpaid because
physicians pressured them to settle, because insurers wanted to limit defense costs, or
because insurers sought to avoid lawsuits by physicians asserting bad faith refusal to
settle claims.19
At prevailing insurance levels, physicians’ personal assets seem secure. Ignoring
deductibles, primary and excess carriers provided over 99 percent of dollars paid to
claimants; out-of-pocket payments were few. Policy limits seem to act as de facto caps
on malpractice recoveries, even when plaintiffs’ damages exceed the limits. In the
debate over statutory caps, these informal caps are rarely given their due. If policy
limits essentially cap amounts collectible by claimants, statutory caps set above
prevailing limits will have less impact on payments and premiums than one might
predict.20
Why are out-of-pocket payments so uncommon? Several reasons may account for
this. First, it is costly to collect judgments from physicians personally and the
economics of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ practices may pressure them to settle for readily
available insurance dollars.21 Second, demands for out-of-pocket payments may delay
the receipt of dollars insurers offer within the limits, because insurers will not settle
without obtaining releases for their insureds. Third, many physicians have limited
17
18
19
20
21

Sage (2004).
Hyman et al. (2007).
Syverud (1990).
The impact of the damages caps Texas enacted in 2003 is studied in Hyman et al. (2008).
Gilles (2006); Baker (2001).
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assets or use asset protection strategies to insulate their wealth.22 Fourth, plaintiffs’
attorneys may adhere to a professional norm that makes defendants’ personal assets
fair game only when defendants commit especially heinous acts or intentionally underinsure. Interviews confirm that plaintiffs’ lawyers seek personal assets rarely.23
Although our results will enlighten policymakers who wish to understand the
connection between insurance markets and the malpractice liability system, they are
subject to important limitations. First, our data set contains reports of insurance
policies relating only to paid claims, which may not constitute a representative sample
of all insurance policies in effect in a given year. Further study is required to determine
whether the purchasing habits of physicians with paid claims differ from those of other
physicians. Second, we lack data on physician specialty, so we have limited ability to
identify differences in insuring patterns, out-of-pocket payments, or other matters
across practice areas. Third, although Texas is the second largest state in terms of
population, and third largest state in spending on health care, it is only one state.
Doctors’ insuring habits, the frequency of settlements above the policy limits and the
number of out-of-pocket payments may differ across states. That said, the practice of
settling for insurance money appears to be common across jurisdictions. Many
commentators refer to it,24 and an unpublished examination of Florida closed claims
revealed a spike in settlements at the policy limits.25
Our data do not explain physicians’ insurance purchasing decisions. We also have
not explained why real coverage levels declined over time. Physicians may take
guidance from other physicians, hospitals, managed care organizations, brokers,
medical societies, or financial advisors. They may have purchased less real coverage
because they needed less insurance (owing to tort reforms or improvements in patient
safety), because the cost of insurance increased, or because they sought to drive down
payments on claims by making less insurance money available to malpractice
plaintiffs. These factors may affect perinatal physicians and other physicians to
different degrees, contributing to the differences we observed between the groups.
Additional work is needed to explain our findings and to assess their implications for
efforts to improve patient safety and to ensure that injured patients receive
appropriate compensation while avoiding waste in the tort system.

Glossary
Claim:
Claims-made policy:
Closed claim:

22
23
24
25

request by an insured for indemnification by an insurance
company for loss incurred from an insured peril
an insurance policy that covers claims made during the
coverage year
a claim that has been reported to TDI as having been settled
or otherwise disposed of, with all indemnity and expense
payments having been made

Stark and Gilman (2005); Tolkoff (2006).
Baker (2001).
For discussions, see Baker (2001); Rice (2003); Silver and Syverud (1995).
Watanabe (undated and unpublished).
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a policy purchased by a physician from an excess carrier to
cover amounts in excess of primary policy limits
Occurrence policy:
an insurance policy that covers claims for harm stemming
from services rendered during a coverage year
Out-of-pocket payment: a payment (other than a deductible payment) made by an
insured physician to resolve a claim
Purchase year:
the year during which the policy was purchased by a
physician. We imputed purchase years using injury date,
claim date, and type of policy. For claims-made policies,
which cover claims made during a coverage year, we set the
purchase year as the year a claim was reported (5,911
claims). For occurrence polices, which cover claims for harm
stemming from services rendered during a coverage year, we
set the purchase year to the year an injury occurred (3,614
claims).
Excess policy:
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